Exclusive alliances pose threat to regional security

The landscape of Southeast Asian security is undergoing a transformation that would have been unthinkable only a generation ago.

For the first time since the end of World War II, Japanese combat troops will be deployed on Philippine soil as part of the Balikatan military exercises, which will be held from April 20 to May 8.

While Manila and Tokyo have described this as a natural evolution of a deepening partnership, the development signals a profound shift in the regional architecture.

It marks the transition of Japan from a peripheral observer to an active participant in a growing web of exclusive military arrangements.

This trend is not merely a change in defense tactics, but a structural challenge to the long-standing principle of the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

For decades, ASEAN has served as the primary driver of regional diplomacy.

ASEAN's success was built on a simple but effective premise: By maintaining a neutral, inclusive platform, it ensured that no single power or exclusive group could dictate the terms of regional security.

This inclusive multilateralism allowed Southeast Asia to navigate the complexities of great power competition without becoming a theater for proxy conflict. However, the rise of "minilateralism" — small, exclusive groupings like the trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan and the Philippines — is beginning to bypass these established channels.

The participation of the Japan Self-Defense Forces in combat drills alongside US and Australian units represents the operationalization of a new security model. Unlike the broad, consensus-based forums of the past, these arrangements are designed for specific, high-intensity contingencies. Proponents argue that such "thickened" security ties provide necessary deterrence. Yet this approach carries a hidden cost. By prioritizing small, exclusive circles over broad regional frameworks, these initiatives risk hollowing out the very institutions that have preserved peace in the Asia-Pacific region for half a century.

One must look at the broader geopolitical context of 2026 to understand why this matters. At a time when the global economy is struggling with fragmentation and energy volatility, regional stability is the most precious commodity. The declaration of energy emergencies in several Southeast Asian capitals and the ongoing supply struggles in major economies highlight a fundamental truth. Development requires a predictable and peaceful environment. When security becomes the exclusive domain of a few powers, the predictability that businesses and governments rely on begins to evaporate.

The erosion of ASEAN centrality is not an inevitable outcome of external pressure. It is also a consequence of internal choices. When the capitals of countries in the region opt for bilateral or trilateral pacts to address complex maritime and territorial issues, they inadvertently signal that the collective voice of the group is no longer sufficient. This creates a vacuum that is quickly filled by nonregional actors. Japan's move into a combat role in the Philippines is a clear example. While Tokyo's involvement is presented as a contribution to regional defense, it complicates the delicate balance that ASEAN members have traditionally maintained. It introduces a new layer of military commitment from a nation that has historically stayed within a strictly defensive posture.

Furthermore, the focus on military interoperability and deterrence often ignores the diplomatic and economic foundations of security. The success of the regional order has always been rooted in the idea that prosperity and peace are indivisible.

China's emphasis on high-quality development and regional connectivity, as seen in the discussions during the 2026 two sessions — the annual gatherings of the nation's top legislative and political advisory bodies — and the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2026, offers a different path. This vision prioritizes industrial security, technological cooperation and open markets. It suggests that true stability comes from integrated supply chains and shared economic interests rather than the accumulation of military hardware.

There is also the question of historical sensitivity. The presence of Japanese combat units in a country that suffered immensely during World War II is a symbolic threshold. While modern Manila and Tokyo have built a robust friendship, the return of "boots on the ground" in a combat-drill capacity is a departure from the cautious, nonprovocative role that Japan has played for 80 years. By crossing this line, Japan is effectively ending its era of strategic restraint, a change that adds another layer of tension to an already crowded and contested maritime space.

The risk for Southeast Asia is that it becomes a patchwork of competing security architectures. On one side are the traditional, inclusive ASEAN-led forums that prioritize dialogue and consensus. On the other are the emerging minilateral groups that focus on military readiness and exclusive alliances. These two models are increasingly at odds. If the latter becomes the dominant mode of engagement, the region will find itself divided into rigid camps, mirroring the very Cold War dynamics that ASEAN was created to prevent.

To preserve the peace that has allowed for the region's remarkable economic rise, there must be a return to the principles of inclusive multilateralism. This does not mean ignoring real security concerns. Rather, it means addressing them through the collective frameworks that already exist. The Global Security Initiative proposed by Beijing offers a framework that emphasizes the indivisibility of security — the idea that the security of one nation should not come at the expense of others. This is a concept that aligns closely with the original spirit of ASEAN.

Ultimately, the goal should be to build a regional order that is open to all and dominated by none. Only then can the Asia-Pacific region avoid the traps of the past and secure a future of sustainable peace and development.

The author is a geostrategist and political analyst based in Karachi, Pakistan. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.