Middle East chaos should not be imported to South China Sea

As the flames of conflict rage in the Strait of Hormuz, oil prices have surged past $100 a barrel, driven by United States and Israeli attacks on Iran and Iran's retaliatory measures. A vital artery carrying a quarter of the world's crude oil and LNG has been turned into a battlefield, sending shockwaves through global markets and pinching household budgets far beyond the Gulf.

In this climate of uncertainty, some commentaries have drawn parallels to other strategic sea lanes — most notably the South China Sea — pointing out that both are indispensable to energy security and world trade. They are right to note the numbers: nearly a third of global crude and more than half of LNG pass through the South China Sea, alongside $3.6-5.3 trillion in annual goods, from electronics and automobiles to textiles and consumer staples. The strategic importance is undeniable. Yet here the mirror cracks.

Hormuz is bleeding from active war. The South China Sea, by contrast, remains one of the safest and busiest maritime highways on Earth. Tens of thousands of cargo vessels traverse its 3.5 million square kilometers every year without a single commercial ship lost to conflict.

China and ASEAN nations alike have been the greatest beneficiaries of this unbroken peace. While distant chokepoints burn and markets tremble, the South China Sea still shines as a rare pocket of stability in a fracturing world. That contrast is not accidental; it is the result of sustained restraint, practical cooperation, and a shared regional commitment to keeping vital lanes open.

Some analyses portray China as "claiming most of the South China Sea, to the prejudice of other claimant countries." This caricature misses a fundamental reality.

The South China Sea issue arises precisely from territorial disputes over certain islands and reefs in the Nansha Islands and maritime delimitation controversies. It is one of the most complex mixed-type disputes in the world — entangling sovereignty, historic rights, and boundary questions in a way few other maritime flashpoints can match.

This complexity is exactly why China has consistently maintained that the 2016 arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction over questions of territorial sovereignty. The tribunal itself acknowledged as much, yet that crucial legal nuance is too often glossed over in heated rhetoric.

Let's clear the fog on China's actual position. China has never asserted sovereignty over every drop of water inside the nine-dash line. What we do assert  and what international law fully supports — is sovereignty over the islands and reefs that have been Chinese for centuries, together with the exclusive economic zones and continental shelves generated by those features under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Layered on top are historic rights that are rich, varied, and sometimes non-exclusive: traditional fishing grounds worked for generations, seasonal access routes, and resource-sharing practices that predate modern legal regimes.

These rights are not a blanket "no trespassing" sign but a tapestry of layered interests that have sustained communities across the region for hundreds of years. Turning this intricate, mixed dispute into a simple aggressor-victim storyline only inflames the very tensions everyone claims to fear and distracts from the real work of peaceful management.

The call for ASEAN, under this year's chair, to "summon the moral courage" and finally conclude a Code of Conduct is understandable. Courage, however, also means resisting the urge to import Middle East chaos into Asian waters. While Washington's attention is fixed on Iran, US military activities in the Asia-Pacific have continued without pause — the upcoming bilateral drills are proceeding exactly as scheduled.

When external powers are drawn ever deeper into the region's affairs through ever-closer military alignments, friction is hardly surprising. As the largest coastal state and one of the busiest users of these sea lanes, China possesses both the will and the demonstrated capacity to keep shipping safe and open for all.

ASEAN capitals understand this too; quiet voices from Jakarta to Kuala Lumpur and Singapore increasingly question the wisdom of relying on outside actors to manage what are fundamentally regional differences. True moral courage lies in prioritizing regional unity, dialogue, and self-reliance over imported drama.

The Code of Conduct itself is no silver bullet, and pretending otherwise serves no one. It is a practical crisis-management mechanism, designed to keep disagreements from escalating while sovereignty and boundary talks continue their course. Recent acceleration in negotiations springs not from distant wars but from the shared desire of China and ASEAN to safeguard the peace we already enjoy.

When — if — the code is concluded, no one should expect instant utopia. Maritime incidents may still flare from time to time; interpretations of certain clauses will inevitably differ; and new frictions will test our collective resolve. That is the normal rhythm of diplomacy in any complex region.

The real value lies in what follows: concrete cooperation on marine science, environmental protection, fisheries management, and joint development within the code's framework--turning potential flashpoints into platforms for mutual benefit. And should the timeline slip?

Steady, stage-by-stage progress is already underway through working groups and confidence-building measures. Blaming any single side for every delay ignores a simple truth — diplomacy is a marathon, not a sound bite, and all parties must shoulder responsibility for keeping the process on track.

The South China Sea does not need imported ultimatums, manufactured crises, or water-cannon headlines to remain prosperous. It needs cool heads, clear facts, and the collective will of the coastal nations to keep the lanes open, the fish abundant, the energy flowing, and the future secure for every trading nation that depends on these waters.

Ding Duo is the director of the Center for International and Regional Studies, National Institute for South China Sea Studies.

The views don't necessarily represent those of China Daily.

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